Turbo Timmy’s Sneaky Scam (Part Two)
Justice Litle, Editorial Director, Taipan Publishing Group
In part two of “Turbo Timmy’s Sneaky Scam,” Justice looks at the ways and means by which a giant Treasury-orchestrated con job might succeed.
In part one of this series on Friday, we talked about why the Geithner ârescue planâ canât work as advertised… and why any honest attempt to implement this thing is doomed to fail (as a number of credentialed economists are predicting will happen).
But we closed part one with the following caveat (more or less): While no honest version of this turkey will fly, a flat-out con job might actually succeed.
There are lots of ways to skin a cat… or a U.S. taxpayer, as it were. To explain what I mean, weâll turn to analogy one more time…
A Classic Con
As the great housing bubble turned to bust, ugly stories arose of slick con men (and women) ripping off community bankers, wide-eyed innocents, and pretty much anyone else they could steal from, with targeted real estate scams.
These scams typically revolved around phony or fraudulent transactions â deliberately inflating the value of a property, then initiating a bogus exchange between buyer and seller with later intent to defraud.
There were many different variations on the scam, but the endgame was always the same. The original buyer, the original seller, and or sometimes even both with the appraiser thrown in for good measure, were revealed to be on the take. The charlatans would keep a low profile, get paid as discreetly as possible, and try to be long gone by the time the truth came to light.
How does this apply to the Geithner rescue plan?
Well, remember the crux of the problem: The âpublic-privateâ partnership is a nonstarter because honest investors have no natural compunction to throw good money after bad. They wonât make the high bids necessary to keep the banks solvent. (What we have here, by the way, is not a liquidity problem but a solvency problem â something that Turbo Timmy, Sheila Bair at the FDIC, and Team Obama on the whole refuse to admit.)
So honest private investors would tell Turbo Timmy to forget it. But dishonest investors… well now, thatâs another story.
Dishonest investors just might be willing to buy up the banksâ bad assets at inflated prices, knowingly setting themselves up for a loss… with further knowledge that the real payoff will come later.
Remember Franky Flipper from Friday? Once again, Franky, your pal, is in trouble, and you are a government official.
Did I mention you are a very powerful government official? So you call up your friend Harry Hedgie â a big-shot private investor â and this is what you say:
âSay, Harry old buddy! Howâs things? Listen Harry, have I got a deal for you. Youâre gonna love this, IÂ promise… Our mutual friend Franky â you know Franky â is in a real bind. So hereâs what I need you to do. I need you to buy a couple spec houses off him, and I need you to mark up your bid good and high… pay him a very nice price. I know itâs a fire-sale market, but a fire-sale bid wonât do. Franky is good people and we just canât let him go under. Heâs a bit too connected himself if you know what I mean. What kind of bid price are we talking, you ask? Well letâs see. He got in to these dogs around 0K apiece… so I need you to bid, say, 0-0KÂ minimum, maybe even a touch more.
âWhoa, whoa! Donât yell into the phone Harry, Iâm right here. Believe me, I know. I know the properties are crap. I know they might not even be worth half what Iâm asking you to bid. And I know you wouldnât flush money down the toilet on purpose. Thatâs why youâre Harry Hedgie, the big-shot investor that you are. But give me a little credit too, huh? Would I even be calling you without a way to make it worth your while?
âSo hereâs the deal… all we need to do is give Franky the appearance of solvency. Once heâs looking good again, weâll have time and room to shuffle money around to the serious benefit of a few connected folks â including you, Harry olâ pal. If you take a small guaranteed loss on this set-up, Iâll make it well worth your while. Youâll only have to put up a tiny fraction of the total price â weâre talking less than ,000 per house. That little slice is the most youâll be at risk for. All the other leverage, roughly 85% of the losses, are for Uncle Sam and John Q. Taxpayer to worry about.
âYouâll probably wind up losing your upfront collateral. Thatâs how it goes with making an inflated bid… eventually the true value of the asset comes out in the wash. But Harry old buddy, if you do this, if you take this short-term hit, then I swear Iâll make it worth your while.
âIf you hold your nose and make this bid for me, Harry my friend, in my capacity as a government official I will make sure you get a sweet return on your investment in some other, shall we say, âalternativeâ way. Iâm a pretty powerful guy… getting more powerful by the day too… so you know there are all kinds of things I can do for you. Think of all the different ways we could put that money back in your pocket. Heck, we can dream up some payback plans before you even give me a verbal. What do you say?â
The Cloak of Complexity
Once the fix is in, with both sides clued in to the sham and the government enabling it, the rest is just detail work.
After all, Congress and the public are all too easy to hoodwink. Just keep âem distracted with a bunch of populist guff about bonuses… throw a high profile scapegoat or two (like the head of AIG) to the media wolves… then get on to the real business of grand larceny and financial highway robbery under the cover of boring acronyms and complicated spreadsheet manipulations.
Just think of all the angles crafty mortgage cons came up with to milk the housing boom. Then think about the fact that those guys were small time, without the benefit of Ivy League business school training or decades of immersion in the esoterica of high finance.
In other words: When you get Wall Streetâs best and brightest motivated to put money in their pockets under cover of darkness, the prestidigitation that follows could put David Copperfield to shame.
My general expectation, if things go according to Turbo Timmyâs liking, is that the rescue plan will be billed as more or less a success. There will be strange numbers, strange accounting, and dubious happenings popping up here and there, but by and large it wonât be enough to cause a media problem. A few sharp-eyed observers might squawk… but overall the publicâs eyes will glaze over.
And then, if Nouriel Roubiniâs present assessment is correct â that the banks are still stuffed with rotten apple assets â most of those rotten apples will be transferred directly into the taxpayerâs lap.
The thrust of the Geithner plan is to give the private participants 14X leverage (roughly 7 cents out of every dollar). The government provides the leverage and takes liability (on behalf of the taxpayer) for the rest. That means for every dollar that vaporizes, you and I as taxpayers will pay almost 93 cents.
If we see a further blowup later this year or next year, as Roubini expects, the total bill could come to trillions of additional dollars. Under more honest circumstances, this would count as more (lots more) additional bailout money the Fed and Treasury would have to request from Congress.
But thanks to the bait-and-switch rescue plan â scam that it is, with the private investors functioning as paid shills â Turbo Timmy has set things up so that the American people have no more say in the matter. The banks will be saved in very slick fashion… including the current crop of shareholders, bondholders and executives… while you and I pay through the nose on a scale that makes the AIG bonuses look like a fight over a stick of bubblegum.
A Pretty Good Scam
So thatâs my take on the Geithner rescue plan. I didnât bother with the specific details because you can read about those in The Wall Street Journal, USA Today and what have you.
Understanding the scam-like nature of this thing might also account for the different notes being struck in the media… take guys like Paul Krugman and James K. Galbraith for example. These two are as left-wing liberal as they come.
Iâm not insulting Krugman or Galbraith in saying that â itâs simply an open orientation and a point of pride for them. Krugmanâs blog is even called âthe conscience of a liberal.â Being proud left-wingers, they are natural Team Obama fans. If anyone were in the âhope and changeâ camp, it would be them.
And yet, these guys (Krugman and Galbraith) loathe and despise the Geithner plan because they see it for what it is… an utter betrayal of the shining left-wing idealism Barack Obamaâs whole candidacy represented to committed idealists like them.
Krugman and Galbraith know that the only two fair moral assessments of the Geithner plan are âbadâ and âworse:â Either the thing just flat out fails to work, or if it does work, it works by selling out all the principles that a good left-wing idealist stand for.
And then you have cynical, gleeful hand-rubbers like Bill Gross, a.k.a. âthe Bond King.â Gross heads up


